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fourth amendment, the decisions in Mapp and Ker help to attain
this balance.
S. PatrickPhillips

CRIMINAL LAW -

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DRUG ADDICT STATUTE

Relators had pleaded guilty to a charge of drug addiction
under Louisiana R.S. 40:962A. 1 They later instituted habeas
corpus proceedings attacking this statute on grounds that any
punishment for the status of addiction is cruel and unusual in
violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution since addiction may well be involuntary. The
district judge dismissed the proceedings. On certiorari the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed. Held, the Louisiana drug addict
statute penalizes the intentional and habitual use of narcotics
leading to addiction - not merely the resultant status or condition. State ex rel. Blouin v. Walker, 244 La. 699, 154 So. 2d 368
(1963).
It is now well settled that regulation of narcotics and drugs
is a valid exercise of a state's police power. 2 The very serious
nature of the biological and psychological consequences, the close
relationship of crime and addiction, and the alarming increase
of addiction since World War II have prompted the states to
provide severe penalties to curb the narcotics problem.3 Such
statutes should be construed in light of their underlying purpose
to protect public health from the4 insidious consequences of the
unauthorized use of these drugs.
In Robinson v. State of California5 the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional a California law making narcotic addiction a criminal offense with a mandatory imprison1. LA. R.S. 40:962A (1950) : "It is unlawful for any person to manufacture,
possess, have under his control, sell, give, deliver, transport, prescribe, administer,
dispense, or compound any narcotic drug, except as provided in this Sub-part,
or to be or to become an addict as defined in R.S. 40:961." (Emphasis added.)
2. Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41 (1921) ; 17A AM.
Jun. Drugs and Druggists § 9 (1957). Accord, State v. Martin, 192 La. 704, 189
So. 109 (1939) ; State v. Kumpfert, 115 La. 950, 40 So. 365 (1905) ; Allopathic
State Board of Medical Examiners v. Fowler, 50 La. Ann. 1358, 24 So. 809
(1898). See also State v. Thomas, 224 La. 431, 69 So. 2d 738 (1954).
3. See Drug Addiction: Crime or Disease?, 1961 A.B.A.-A.M.A. JOINT COMMITTEE ON NARcoTIC DRuGs REP.

4. Territory v. Hu Seong, 20 Hawaii 669 (1911).
5. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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ment for a minimum of ninety days." In holding the California

statute inflicted a cruel and unusual punishment,7 the majority
emphasized that the statute, as construed by the California
court," punished a status of being ill 9 without regard to whether
the illness was voluntary. 10

Louisiana's narcotic law1 ' is for the most part an enactment
of the Uniform Drug Act. 12 The addiction provisions, however,
6. CALIF. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721: "No person shall use, or be under
the influence of, or be addicted to the use of narcotics . . . . It shall be the burden
of the defense to show that it comes within the exception. Any person convicted
of violating any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be
sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one year in the
County jail. The court may place a person convicted hereunder on probation for
a period not to exceed 5 years and shall in all cases in which probation is granted
require as a condition thereof that such person be confined in the county jail for
at least 90 days. In no event does the court have the power to absolve a person
who violates this section from the obligation of spending at least 90 days in confinement in the county jail."
7. 370 U.S. at 667: "We hold that a state law which imprisons a person thus
afflicted as a criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within
the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either
cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be considered in the abstract. Even
one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of
having a common cold."
8. In the Robinson case the trial judge had instructed the jury that the California statute made it a misdemeanor for a person either (1) to commit the act
of using narcotics or (2) to be addicted to the use of narcotics; and further that
these offenses were different, the portion of the statute which deals with addiction being based upon the condition of status and not an act of using.
The court held these instructions binding on them and Mr. Justice Stewart, in
closing his opinion, reiterated: "We deal in this case only with an individual provision of a particularized local law as it has so far been interpreted by the California Courts." Id. at 668.
9. Id. at 666: "This statute, therefore, is not one which punishes a person for
the use of narcotics, for their purchase, sale or possession, or for antisocial or
disorderly behavior resulting from their administration. It is not a law which
even purports to provide or require medical treatment. Rather we deal with a
statute which makes the 'status' of narcotics addiction a criminal offense, for
which the offender may be prosecuted 'at any time before he reforms.' California
has said that a person can be continuously guilty of this offense, whether or not
he has ever used or possessed any narcotics within the state, and whether or not
he has been guilty of any antisocial behavior there." See also Utah v. Zeimer, 10
Utah 2d 45, 347 P.2d 1111, 79 A.L.R.2d 821 (1960) ("habitual criminal" is a
status, not a crime; reversible error to charge as a crime). In People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N.E. 301, 92 A.L.R. 1228 (1934) a statute subjecting
all persons reputed to be habitual violators to conviction as vagabonds was held
unconstitutional- the court defining repute as reputation or opinion. But cf.
cases where vagrancy as a status may be punished criminally. See, e.g., District
of Columbia v. Hunt, 163 F.2d 833 (1947) ; People v. Arlington, 103 Cal. App.
2d 911, 229 P.2d 495 (1951); Handler v. Denver, 102 Colo. 53, 77 P.2d 132
(1938) ; Commonwealth v. Diamond, 248 Mass. 511, 143 N.E. 503 (1924) ; State
v. Susnan, 216 Minn. 293, 12 N.W.2d 620 (1943).
10. 370 U.S. at 667 n. 9.
11. LA. R.S. 40:961-984 (Supp. 1962).
12. 9B UNiFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, Uniform Drug Act.
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were added later.15 In recognizing this state's right to deal with
the use of narcotics and drugs, Louisiana courts have held denial
of parole to a person convicted under the narcotics statute is not
cruel and unusual punishment 14 under the United States Constitution15 nor the Louisiana Constitution. 16 On the other hand,

the court has been cognizant of the requirement of reasonableness and has held unconstitutional a statute making any possession of a hypodermic syringe a crime,' 7 finding that it placed
an unreasonable presumption of intended illegal use on the mere
possession of an instrument having many meritorious uses.'"
R.S. 40:962A, the section drawn in question in the instant
case, provides inter alia that it is unlawful for a person "to be or
become" an addict. 19 An addict is defined as a person who "habitually uses" narcotics to such an extent as to create a tolerance
for them. ° For purposes of rehabilitation the statute further
provides that the court may suspend the sentence of first offenders in favor of probation conditioned upon voluntary en2
trance into a public health hospital. '
In the instant case the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected
relators' argument that R.S. 40:962A could be analogized 22 to
13. La. Acts 1948, No. 14, § 2, now LA. R.S. 40:961(1) (Supp. 1962).
14. State v. Bellam, 225 La. 445, 73 So. 2d 311 (1954) ; State v. Thomas,
224 La. 431, 69 So. 2d 738 (1954).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII and XIV, § 1.
16. LA. CONST. art. I, § 12, provides in part: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
17. LA. R.S. 40:962B (1950).
18. State v. Birdsell, 235 La. 396, 104 So. 2d 148 (1958), noted 19 LA. L. REv.
519 (1959), 33 TUL. L. REv.216 (1958).
19. LA. R.S. 40:962A (1950). See note 1 supra.
20. LA. R.S. 40:961(1) (1950), as amended (Supp. 1962): "'Addict' means
a person who habitually uses one or more of the narcotic drugs defined in this
Section to such an extent as to create a tolerance for such drug, or drugs, and
who does not have a medical need for the use of such drug, or drugs."
21. LA. R.S. 40:981 (Supp. 1962) provides in part: "In cases of conviction
for the offense of being an addict as defined in R.S. 40:961 the court may, in its
discretion, if such conviction be the first had by the offender for violating any
of the provisions of this Sub-part, suspend the execution of the sentence and
place such offender on probation, . . . conditioned upon such person voluntarily
entering within 30 days, one of the United States Public Health Service Hospitals
and remaining in such hospital until certified by the medical officer in charge as
being cured, and conditioned upon such person's good behaviour for the remainder
of his sentence. Any such addict placed upon probation shall pay all costs incident
to gaining admission to such hospital and shall by proper affidavit authorize the
medical officer in charge of such hospital to furnish . . . complete information
concerning his admission, discharge and treatment."
22. The Robinson case inspired numerous attacks on the narcotics statutes of
other states. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 27 Ill. 2d 57, 188 N.E.2d 225 (1963)
(provision making it a criminal offense to be under the influence of or be addicted
to unlawful use of narcotics invalid as inflicting a cruel and unusual punishment) ; Salas v. State, 365 S.W.2d 174 (1963) (conviction under Texas statute
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the California law stricken in Robinson v. State of California
because it punished the mere status of addiction. 28 The court
said it was the habitual use of drugs - not solely the status that was offensive, 24 construing the criminal provision as requiring "intentional use" or "use with guilty knowledge" 2 5 - a
requirement that has been read into other provisions of the narcotics law.26 Since Robinson was predicated on imprisonment

without either use of drugs or irregular behavior in the imprisoning state, 27 the instant case does not appear inconsistent
with it. It is clear, however, that there can be no conviction
under the Louisiana addict provision without evidence of intentional use of the proscribed drugs in Louisiana. A conviction
without showing such use would be punishment for the status
of addiction itself and invalid under Robinson.
This constitutional interpretation given the statute by the
Louisiana Supreme Court restricts its intended use. Furthermore, since an addict who abstains from use in Louisiana may
not now be coerced into rehabilitative treatment, 28 the instant
affirmed as defendant was charged with the "act" of being under the influence
of narcotics).
23. It is significant that the majority of the United States Supreme Court in'
the Robinson case viewed the California statute as interpreted by the lower California court. The majority in the instant case took this same approach and interpreted the Louisiana statute to avoid the California pitfall, while Justice McCaleb
in his dissent viewed the statute as written and concluded that the statute as
written was unconstitutional.
24. "[T]he habitual use of a narcotic as denounced by the Louisiana statute
necessarily comprises a series of acts committed intentionally or voluntarily.
154 So. 2d at 371.
25. Ibid.: "[It is] clear that the Louisiana statute, unlike the California law
as interpreted by the courts of that state, penalizes not the status or condition'
of addiction but rather the habitual use of narcotics leading to such a status.,
Moreover, the intentional use of such drugs (or their use with guilty knowledge)
is, under our law, a necessary element of the crime of becoming an addict which
must be proved by the state just as criminal intent is required to be shown in
most other prosecutions."
26. The court followed a rule in Louisiana jurisprudence that "guilty knowledge" is an essential element in the crime of possession of narcotics. State v. Johnson, 228 La. 317, 82 So. 2d 24 (1955) ; State v. Howard, 162 La. 719, 111 So.
72 (1926). See also State v. Peltier, 229 La. 745, 86 So. 2d 693 (1946) ; State v.
Nicolosi, 228 La. 65, 81 So. 2d 771 (1955). Accord, State v. Birdsell, 232 La.
725, 95 So. 2d 290 (1957) (guilty knowledge necessary to constitute the crime of
possessing a hypodermic syringe). But cf. State v. Birdsell, 235 La. 396, 104
So. 2d 148 (1958), in which the court, apparently ignoring the holding in the
1957 Birdsell case, held that LA. R.S. 40:962B (1950), which prohibits possession
of a hypodermic syringe was unconstitutional as placing an unreasonable presumption of illegal use in the unauthorized possession of a hypodermic syringe.
It was implicit in the reasoning that the statute was construed as punishing the
mere possession of the prohibited articles regardless of their intended use. See
generally Notes, 19 LA. L. REv. 519 (1959), 33 TUL. L. REV. 216 (1958).
27. See note 7 supra.
28. If a person habitually used narcotics in another state and then came intq
Louisiana as an addict, it would appear that no conviction could now be sustained'
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case clearly indicates a void in the present Louisiana narcotics
law. It is submitted that, since rehabilitation should be the

state's primary motive in confining addicts, this void should be
filled by a statute utilizing the state's police power to confine
addicts for rehabilitative treatment. 29 Louisiana would then pos-

sess a modern and constitutionally tested narcotics law imposing
criminal sanctions for unauthorized use and providing compul-

sory treatment without criminal conviction for those afflicted
with addiction.
James S. Holliday, Jr.

FAMILY LAW -

ALIMONY -

EFFECT OF FAULT WHEN WIFE

OBTAINS DIVORCE UNDER LA. R.S. 9:301

Plaintiff wife instituted suit in 1958 for separation from bed
and board on the grounds of abandonment and cruelty.' The
trial court rejected, on the ground of mutual fault, the demand
of the wife; she appealed. While the cause was pending, both
parties filed for judicial separation on the ground of living separate and apart for one year. 2 Separation was granted in the

husband's suit which was served first3 In 1960 both parties
filed suit for absolute divorce on the ground they had remained
under the addict provision without a clear showing that he committed some act
in Louisiana contributing to his addiction. Without conviction as an addict, there
could be no compulsory confinement for treatment under LA. R.S. 40:981 (1950),
as amended (Supp. 1962).
29. In the Robinlon case the court affirmed the states' power to impose compulsory treatment and involuntary confinement for those addicted to the use of
narcotics with criminal sanctions attached for noncompliance. In a footnote it
was mentioned that California had a civil program for treatment in sections 53505361 of its Welfare and Institutions Code. See In re DeLa 0, 28 Cal. Reptr. 489,
378 P.2d 793 (1963) (upheld compulsory treatment and rehabilitation procedures
for narcotics addicts).
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 138 (1870) : "Separation from bed and board may be
claimed reciprocally for the following causes: ...
"(3) On account of habitual intemperances of one of the married persons, or
excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages of one of them toward the other, if such
habitual intemperance, or such ill treatment is of such a nature as to render their
living together insupportable ...
"(5) Of the abandonment of the husband by his wife or the wife by her
husband .... "
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 138 (1870) : "Separation from bed and board may be
claimed reciprocally for the following causes: ...
"(9) When the husband and wife have voluntarily lived separate and apart
for one year and no reconciliation has taken place during that time."
3. This case has a very interesting custody issue that is beyond the scope of
this Note.

